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This paper presents a method to assign utility values when partial information is available 
about the decision maker’s preferences. We introduce an analogy between probability and utility 
through the notion of a utility density function and illustrate the application of this analogy to the 
maximum entropy principle. The maximum entropy utility solution embeds a large family of 
utility functions that includes the most commonly used functional forms. We discuss the 
implications of “maximum entropy utility” on the preference behavior of the decision maker and 
present an application to competitive bidding situations where only previous decisions are 
observed by each party. We also present “minimum cross entropy utility” which incorporates 
additional knowledge about the shape of the utility function into the maximum entropy 
formulation, and work through several examples to illustrate the approach.   
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Page 1 1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we present a method to assign utility values when only partial information is 
available about the decision maker’s preferences. We assume in all of our analyses that the 
decision maker follows the axioms of normative utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1947) and in particular (1) can provide the complete preference order for the prospects 
(consequences) of a decision situation and (2) has transitive preferences. These requirements 
may seem difficult at first; however, we note that in many cases of decision analysis practice, 
such as when monetary prospects are involved, both transitivity and the complete order of the 
prospects are reasonable assumptions if the decision maker prefers more money to less.  
We remind the reader that when a decision problem is deterministic, the order of the 
prospects is sufficient to determine the optimal decision alternative. However, when uncertainty 
is present, the von Neumann and Morgenstern utility values need to be assigned. Our approach 
starts with the ordinal preference of the prospects and ends with the assignment of cardinal 
utilities when partial preference information is available. By partial preference information we 
mean any information that does not include the utility values but does include the order of the 
prospects. Partial preference information includes knowing some utility values, observing 
previous decisions made by the decision maker, or even knowing bounds on the domain of the 
prospects. Partial preference information is often encountered in practice where (1) time or 
health constraints prevent complete elicitation of utility values; (2) the decision maker is 
unavailable or unwilling to assign utility values; (3) there is no single decision maker but rather a 
group, which may be able to reach consensus only on the preference order but not on the utility 
values (Kirkwood and Sarin 1985); and (4) in competitive bidding situations where a decision 
maker is trying to infer the utility values of others by observing their decisions.  
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decision alternatives using additive value functions when only the rank order of the attributes is 
available. Butler, Jia and Dyer (1997) use simulation and joint sensitivity analysis to select the 
optimal decision alternative when only the rank order is available; Rao and Sobel (1980) use the 
rank order to derive a marginal distribution for the k  largest weight; Barron and Barret (1996) 
compare three approximate formulas to estimate the weights; and Jessop (1999) uses normalized 
attributes and a maximum entropy formulation to determine the weights. In comparison, our 
formulation applies to utility functions (not to value functions) and makes no assumptions about 
the structure of the utility function or the value function being additive.  
th
The core idea of our approach uses a utility function that is normalized to range from zero 
to one. We define a utility density function as the derivative of a normalized utility function.  
Based on this definition, a utility density function has two main properties: it is non-negative and 
integrates to unity. These two properties form the basis of an analogy between probability and 
utility that transfers many tools from one domain into the other. In this paper, we build on this 
analogy to assign utility values with partial preference information.   
The utility-probability analogy that we develop in this paper has not been seen in our search 
of the literature. Berhold (1973) rescales probability distributions to obtain convenient 
expressions for utility functions but he does not introduce this analogy. Castagnoli and LiCalzi 
(1996) interpret a normalized utility function as a probability distribution of an uncertain target 
that is independent of the lotteries faced by the decision maker. In contrast we do not interpret 
utility values as describing anything other than preferences and we interpret the normalized 
utility function as simply representing the preferences of the decision maker using the von 
Neumann and Morgenstern approach. Our work thus preserves the separation of beliefs about the 
likelihood of events from preferences over the results of those events.   
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on the analogy between probability and utility. Section 3 provides an interpretation for the 
entropy of a utility function in both the discrete and continuous cases, and proposes the 
maximum entropy utility principle to assign utility values based on partial preference 
information. Section 4 presents the maximum entropy utility solution that includes the most 
commonly used forms of utility functions. Section 5 presents several applications of maximum 
entropy utility, and Section 6 presents minimum cross entropy utility, where additional 
knowledge about the shape of the utility function can be incorporated.   
2. UTILITY – PROBABILITY ANALOGY 
The analogy between probability and utility appears naturally in the probabilistic 
equivalence used in the von Neumann and Morgenstern utility assessments. Recall that when 
eliciting the utility value of a prospect, B, we have three ordered prospects,  , and we 
are indifferent between receiving 
ABC ;;
B for sure and a binary gamble with a probability,  , of 
yielding A, and a probability 1  of yielding C. Howard (1992) observes this correspondence 
and suggests that the von Neumann and Morgenstern utility be called a “preference probability”. 
B U
B U −
 In this paper, we present new definitions in both the discrete and continuous cases that 
highlight the analogy between probability and utility, and translate many tools from one domain 
into the other.  
2.1. Discrete Case: Utility Vector and Utility-Increment Vector 
The first definition is a utility vector for a set of K ordered prospects. A utility vector 
contains the utility values of the prospects starting from lowest to highest. We assume that there 
is at least one prospect, which has strict preference to exclude the case of absolute indifference 
between the K prospects. With no loss of generality, we assign a utility value of zero to the least 
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vector has K elements defined as  
0 1 K−
  .                (1)  0 1 22 1 1 22 ( , , ,......., , ) (0, , ,......., ,1) KK K U uuu u u uu u −− − = 
Note that any utility vector of dimension K can be represented as a point in a (K-2)- 
dimensional space in the region defined by  12 3 2 0 ...... 1 KK uu u u −− ≤ ≤≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ . This region, which 
we call the utility volume, has a volume equal to 
1
(2 ) ! K −
.   
The second definition is a utility-increment vector,  U ∆ , whose elements are equal to the 
difference between the consecutive elements in the utility vector. The utility-increment vector 
has (1 elements defined as  )
1
K −
  12 1 2 1 2 3 ( 0, ,......,1 ) ( , , ,...., ) KK Uu u u u uuu u − − ∆− − − = ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆  .        (2) 
The coordinates of   have two main properties: they are all greater than or equal to zero 
and sum to one.  Therefore, any utility-increment vector can be represented as a point in a (K-1) -
dimensional simplex  . We will refer to this simplex as the utility simplex. A 
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order. The geometric representation of the utility simplex presented above and the two main 
properties of the utility increment vector form the basis of an analogy between probability and 
utility that is the basic premise of this paper. 
2.2. Utility Assignment for Discrete Ordered Prospects 
Now let us consider the following problem: a decision maker provides the preference order 
for a set of K prospects. If a decision analyst would like to assign utility values on behalf of the 
decision maker (or if a decision maker would like to infer another person’s utility values) based 
on this preference order alone, what utility values should s/he assign? To answer this question, 
we observe that any point in the utility simplex satisfies the decision-maker’s preference order of 
the prospects but assigns different utility values to them. In other words, knowledge of the 
preference order alone tells us nothing about the location of the utility increment vector over the 
utility simplex. If all we know about the prospects is their ordering, it is reasonable to assume, 
therefore, that the location of the utility increment vector is uniformly distributed over the utility 
simplex. This assumption gives equal likelihood to all utility values that satisfy the decision 
maker’s preference order, and adds no further information about the location of the utility 
increment vector other than knowledge of the order of the prospects.  
From a mathematical point of view, the assumption of a uniform distribution for the 
location of the utility increment vector over the utility simplex implies that its location is 
described by a Dirichlet distribution whose K-1 parameters are all equal to one. Furthermore, 
properties of Dirichlet distributions suggest that the marginal probability density function for 
each element of the utility increment vector is the Beta density,  , while the  (1, 2) Beta K −
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 (Degroot 1970).  
;    1,..., 2 j K =−
(, 1 ) Beta j K j −−
The previous analysis treats a decision maker’s unknown utility values as random variables 
from the decision analyst’s viewpoint (except for the most preferred and least preferred prospects 
which have values of u  and  1 1 K− = 0 0 u =  respectively). The analysis uses the preference order to 
derive a marginal probability density for each utility value. The problem that we seek to solve, 
however, is the assignment of utility values to all the prospects given the preference order. 
Fortunately, the remaining part of the problem, which assigns a utility value given its marginal 
probability density, is a relatively easy task and has had a large share of literature coverage. For 
example, Howard  (1970) shows that the mean of a random variable is a natural assignment 
given its marginal distribution. We summarize this result for the utility increment vector below. 
Utility Increment Assignment given the Preference Order 
 
When only the preference order is known, the marginal probability density for the 
increments in utility values of K ordered prospects is  (1, 2) Beta K − . The utility increment 




The previous result shows a method to assign utility values for a decision maker when only 
the preference order of the prospects is known. This assignment produces equal increments in 
utility values. In Section 3, we extend the analysis further and present a method to assign utility 
values given the preference order and any other information that may be available about the 
decision maker’s preferences.  
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Now we extend the previous definitions to the continuous case where the number of 
prospects,  , is infinite. We start with prospects of a decision situation, which have only one 
attribute, 
K
x, and discuss the case of multiple attributes in Section 5. A common example of one-
attribute prospects in the continuous case is monetary outcomes over a continuous domain.  
In the continuous case, the utility vector is a utility curve, Ux, over the given domain and is 
normalized to have values between zero and one. The normalized utility curve has the same 
mathematical properties as a cumulative probability distribution as both are non-decreasing and 
range from zero to one. The normalization of the utility function poses no major limitations to 
von Neumann and Morgenstern utility values that are also bounded and range from zero to one.  
( )
The utility increment vector is now the derivative of the normalized utility curve (assuming 
the derivative exists) and we refer to it as a utility density function,  , i.e.  ( ) ux




                                                (3) 
If the utility curve is normalized, then the utility density integrates to unity. The utility 
density function is non-negative, due to the non-decreasing values of the utility curve, and thus 
has the same mathematical properties as a probability density function: both are non-negative 
and integrate to unity.  
Note that the utility value, Ux, of a given prospect,  ( ) x, can be determined by integrating 
the utility density from the least preferred prospect,  min x , (or the lower bound of the monetary 
prospects) up to that prospect, x. i.e.  





Ux uxd x = ∫
We summarize the definitions and analogy between probability and utility in Table 1.  
 






































































































































































2.4. Utility Assignment by Analogy with Probability Assignment 
The utility-probability analogy translates many tools from one domain into the other. To 
demonstrate one example, we refer to the problem of assigning a probability to the outcome of 
an uncertain event in the absence of perfect information. This problem dates back to Laplace’s 
“principle of insufficient reason”.  
Laplace suggested that we assign equal probabilities to all outcomes unless there is 
information that suggests otherwise. If we apply the utility-probability analogy to Laplace’s 
principle of insufficient reason, we have a method for assigning utility values that can be 
expressed as follows: when only the preference order of the prospects is available, we assign 
equal increments in utility values unless there is preference information that suggests otherwise. 
  The utility assignment suggested by this result agrees with the intuitive assignment a 
decision analyst would make when only the order of the prospects is known. The rationale is that 
if we know only the order of the prospects, there should be no reason for one increment in utility 
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Assigning unequal increments implies additional information about the decision maker’s 
preferences that is not included in the preference order alone.  
In this example, the application of the utility-probability analogy to a well-known problem 
in probability resulted in a methodology for assigning utility values that agrees with our intuition 
and with the mathematical results of the uniform Dirichlet distribution over the utility simplex. 
In the next section, we present another application of the utility-probability analogy to measure 
the spread of the utility increment vector and the utility density function.   
3. THE ENTROPY OF A UTILITY FUNCTION   
3.1. Entropy Measure for Discrete Prospects 
Shannon (1948) introduced the term   as a measure of 
uncertainty about a discrete random variable having a probability mass function, 
1
1




Hp p p p
=
=−∑ i
p . He called 
this term the entropy.  Shannon’s entropy term is also a measure of the spread of a probability 
distribution that achieves its maximum value when the distribution assigns equal probabilities to 
all outcomes. Building on this idea, Jaynes (1957) proposed the use of a prior probability 
distribution that maximizes Shannon’ s entropy measure (has maximum spread) and satisfies the 
partial information constraints when no further information is available. Jaynes’ proposition is 
considered to be an extension of Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason, as it incorporates 
additional information, and is known as the maximum entropy principle. It has found wide use in 
the assignment of prior probabilities using partial information.   
It is natural to extend our analogy by considering Shannon’s entropy definition as a 
measure of spread for the coordinates of the utility increment vector 
 












∆∆∆ ∆ = −∆ ∆ ∑ .                         (5) 
If we take the first partial derivative of equation (5) with respect to   and equate it to 
zero, we find that this measure achieves its maximum value when the utility increments are all 
equal. In other words, the utility increment vector that maximizes this entropy measure has the 
same utility increments as those described by the uniform Dirichlet distribution over the utility 
simplex. Maximizing the entropy of the utility increment vector with certain preference 
constraints yields a utility vector that satisfies the given constraints and produces (whenever the 
constraints allow) equal increments in utility values.  
i u ∆
There are other measures that can be used for the spread in the utility increment vector but 
the entropy measure uniquely satisfies three essential axioms that were proposed by Shannon. 
We discuss these axioms as they relate to a measure of spread for the utility increment vector 
below.  
(1) The measure of spread of the utility increment vector is a monotonically increasing 
function of the number of prospects, K, when the utility increments are equal. The rationale for 
this axiom is that the larger the number of prospects with equal utility increments the wider is the 
spread of the utility increment vector.   
(2) The measure of spread of a utility increment vector should be a continuous function of 
the increments.  If one of the utility increments changes slightly, the measure of spread should 
not change abruptly but should change in accordance with the corresponding change in spread.   
(3) The order in which we calculate the measure of spread should not matter. For example, 
if we calculate the spread of a utility increment vector directly using equation (5), or if we 
calculate the spread of subsets of the utility increment vector separately then take a weighted 
average, we should get the same result, 
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123 1 2 3 2 3
23 23
(, ,) (, ( ) ) ( ) ( ,
u u





∆ ∆ ∆ = ∆ ∆ +∆ + ∆ +∆
∆+ ∆ ∆+ ∆
.     (6) 
For example, if we have a utility increment vector  (0.25,0.5,0.25) U ∆ =
0.5log(0.5) 0.25log( −
, we can calculate 
its entropy directly, .    (0.25,0.5,0.25) 0.25log(0.25) 0.25) 1.5log(2) H −− = 
If the last two elements ( and  ) are combined, they have a weight of   
and together they form a utility increment vector that is normalized as 








original increment vector now reduces to two co-ordinates,  R (0.25, U 0.75 ∆ = . The entropy of 
 is therefore less than that of ∆ , but when we add the weighted entropy due to the spread 






(0.25 ) ( , ) 1.5log(2)
33
+= ,0.75 0.75 HH. Both methods thus provide the same 
spread. The entropy measure of equation (5) is the only measure that satisfies these three axioms. 
3.2. Entropy Measure for Continuous Prospects 
Now we discuss the differential form of the entropy expression,  , when applied to a 
utility density function on a domain, [a, b] 
( ) hx
  .                                           (7)  (() ) () l n (() )
b
a
hux ux ux d x =−∫
As shown in the Appendix, if we take the derivative of equation (7) with respect to ux 









, and the differential entropy has a maximum value of l .  The uniform 
utility density integrates to a linear (risk neutral) utility function. Any other utility density has 
less spread with this entropy measure. To gain some further intuition about the implications of 
the maximum entropy and minimum entropy assignments, let us consider the following example. 
n( ) ba −
 
Page 12 Example 1: Entropy of the CARA Utility  
Consider the following constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility density over the 
domain [0, 1]  











,                                         (8) 
where γ is the decision maker’s risk aversion coefficient.  
By direct integration and the use of equation (7), the differential entropy is 










.                                            (9) 
Figure 2 plots the differential entropy vs. the risk aversion,γ , from equation (9).  
Figure 2. Sensitivity analysis of the differential entropy to the risk aversion coefficient.  
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From the results of Figure 2, we can see that the differential entropy has a unique maximum 
that occurs when  0 γ = . Using L’Hopital’s formula, we can show that when  0 γ →  









− = →≤ ≤
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.                                           (10) 
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,  that exhibits risk neutral behavior.  The unique maximum entropy utility 
solution is both concave and convex, and favors no direction of risk attitude (as it occurs at the 
boundary of the two domains). From Figure 2, we note that the entropy is symmetric around 
() ,  0 1 Ux x x =≤ ≤
0 γ = . Therefore the entropy of a risk averse utility function with  3 γ =  (for example) is the 
same as that of a risk seeking utility function with  3 γ = − .  
The differential entropy has no lower bound since hu  as  ( ( )) x →− ∞ γ →+ ∞ (the case of 













 as  γ →+ ∞.                                          (11) 
The impulse utility density integrates to a step (aspiration) utility function that jumps at the lower 
bound of the domain. The step utility function implies both extreme risk averse behavior and a 
steep change in preferences at  .   0 x =
As γ →− ∞ (extreme risk seeking behavior),  , (again) and the utility density 
approaches an impulse density, 
( ( )) hux →− ∞

















From equations (11) and (12) we observe that both cases of extreme risk averse and risk seeking 
behavior correspond to minimum entropy solutions. These solutions imply more about the 
decision maker’s preferences than only the order of the prospects as they also favor one direction 
of risk attitude over the other. Furthermore any impulse function,  00 () , 0 xx x 1 δ − ≤≤ , is also a 
minimum entropy solution that implies a steep change of preferences at the prospect,  0 x . The 
maximum entropy solution, on the other hand, makes no assumptions about steep changes in the 
decision maker’s preferences.  To summarize the results of this section, the maximum entropy assignment produces equal 
increments in utility values for the discrete case, and makes no assumptions about the direction 
of the risk attitude or about steep changes in preferences for the continuous case (unless this 
information is explicitly incorporated into the constraints as we shall see in Section 5).    
3.3. The Maximum Entropy Utility Principle 
Based on the previous results, we are now ready to answer the following question. “Given 
the partial preference information we know about the decision maker, there may be several 
utility values that satisfy the given preference information constraints. What is the unbiased 
assignment of utility values that we should make?” By “unbiased” utility values, we mean those 
that do not lead to arbitrary assumptions of preference information that is not available. For 
example, the assignment of either risk averse or risk seeking behavior to a decision maker is a 
biased assignment unless there is preference information to support it, and the assignment of a 
non-uniform distribution over the utility simplex is a biased assignment when only the order of 
the prospects is available as it gives a set of utility values more likelihood than others.  
To answer the utility assignment question, we propose the following maximum entropy 
utility principle: 
“In making inferences on the basis of partial preference information, we use the utility 
curve (or utility vector) whose utility density function (or utility increment vector) has maximum 
entropy subject to whatever preferences are known”. 
This method of assigning utility values provides an analogy with Jaynes’ maximum entropy 
principle for probability inference. It can be applied to both the continuous and the discrete 
utility forms. We call the utility values obtained from this principle the maximum entropy utility. 
In the next section, we discuss the maximum entropy utility solution given preference 
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provides.  
4. THE MAXIMUM ENTROPY UTILITY FAMILY  
The maximum entropy utility solution for constraints,   with 
and  ux is shown in the Appendix as                                    




hx ux d x i n µ == ∫
() 1  
b
a




01 1 2 2 ( ) ( ) ..... ( ) ()
nn hx hx hx ux e
α αα α − − −− − − = ,                                    (13) 
where  is the maximum entropy utility solution, [a, b] is the domain of prospects, 
is a given preference constraint, 
maxent() ux
() i hx i µ ’s are a given sequence of utility values or moments of 
the utility function, and  i α is the Lagrange multiplier for each utility value or moment constraint.  
The first application of the maximum entropy formulation is that it provides us with a 
general expression for utility functions that includes the most commonly used functional forms. 
For example, the risk neutral utility function, which has a uniform utility density, is a special 
case of equation (13) where the constraints,  , are equal to zero. When   and the 
remaining constraints are zero, the maximum entropy utility is a CARA utility on the positive 
domain. When   and hx
( ) i hx 1() hx x =
1() hx x =
2
2() x = , the maximum entropy utility is a Gaussian utility 
density, which integrates to an S-shaped prospect theory utility function on the real domain 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
The maximum entropy utility solution also embeds the hyperbolic absolute risk averse 
utility function (HARA), which has the form  
 
1 1








,                            (14) 
 
Page 16 and a utility density of the form 










− =+ = ,                             (15) 
where , ,  and  α βγ are given constants. The HARA utility function reduces to a risk neutral 
utility function when  0 γ = ; to a CARA utility function when    γ →±∞
0
; and to a constant 
relative risk averse utility function (CRRA) when  0 and  β γ = > . Comparing equations (13) 
and (15), shows that HARA utility functions can be expressed by the maximum entropy utility 




=+ and the remaining constraints are zero.  
4.1. Maximum Entropy Risk Aversion  
Using equation (13), and Arrow - Pratt’s definition of local risk aversion (Pratt 1964 and 
Arrow 1965), the maximum entropy utility function with constraints   has a risk 
aversion, 
( ),  0,1,... i hx i n =
maxent() x γ , of 
 
''
maxent maxent 1 1 2 2 ( ) ln( ( )) ( ) ( ) ..... ( ) nn
d ' x ux h xh x h
dx






= .   
Equation (16) shows the linear effect contributed by the derivative of each preference 
constraint on the overall risk aversion function. Equation (16) also shows the wide range of risk 
aversion expressions that can be modeled by the maximum entropy utility family.  
5. APPLICATIONS OF MAXIMUM ENTROPY UTILITY 
In this section, we discuss several applications of the maximum entropy utility principle to 
infer utility values in practice using partial preference information. 
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When eliciting a utility curve in practice, we often start by eliciting the utility values for 
some of the prospects.  If we know only some utility values and would like to assign a utility 
function over a continuous domain, we solve for the maximum entropy utility density function 
subject to the given utility values. We illustrate this application through the following example.  
Example 2: The Party Problem 
The party problem, introduced by Ronald Howard at Stanford University, can be 
summarized as follows: Kim is interested in having a party. She has three alternatives: Indoors, 
Outdoors, and on the Porch. However, she is uncertain about the weather situation, which can be 
sunny or rainy. She orders the prospects from best to worst, and assigns utility values and dollar 
equivalents to the prospects she is facing. These values are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Kim’s utility values for some of the monetary prospects. 
Prospect Dollar Value ($) Utility Values
Outdoors, Sunny 100 1
Porch, Sunny 90 0.95
Indoors, Rainy 50 0.67
Indoors, Sunny 40 0.57
Porch, Rainy 20 0.32






Kim has a CARA utility; but let us assume that this information is not provided to the 
decision analyst. Now we would like to determine her continuous maximum entropy utility 
function over the domain of monetary prospects she is facing. The maximum entropy 
formulation for the utility density is                                    
 








() a r g m a x ( () l n (() ) )
  
( ) 0.32, ( ) 0.57, ( ) 0.67,
( ) 0.95, ( ) 1, ( ) 0.
ux u x u x d x
such that
u x dx u x dx u x dx







If we compare the preference constraints,  , of equation (17) to those of (13), we find 
they are in effect indicator functions over certain intervals. For example, the constraint 
, where 





() ()() ()() u x dx I x u x dx h x u x dx == ∫∫ ∫ () I x is an indicator function for  [0,20] x∈ . 
From (13), we can see that the solution to this problem has the form  
              (18) 
0 1 20 2 40 3 50 4 90
maxent
1( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )   0 100 ,
Ix Ix Ix Ix ux x e
αα α α α −− − − − − ≤≤ =
Equation (18) is the staircase utility density shown in Figure 3(a) together with Kim’s 
CARA utility density (not known). In Figure 3(b), we compare the corresponding maximum 
entropy utility function to Kim’s CARA utility. The maximum entropy utility function is 
piecewise linear connecting the given utility values. It exhibits risk neutral behavior over certain 
ranges and risk averse behavior over the whole domain.  
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Page 19 One question that may arise in practice here is the rationale for using the maximum entropy 
utility function rather than finding the best curve fit for the utility assessments provided. The 
basic motivation for the maximum entropy approach is that curve-fitting methods assume a 
certain structure (e.g. the utility function used or the order of the splicing polynomial). The fitted 
utility function will depend on the structure that is chosen for the fit. The maximum entropy 
approach, however, provides a unique utility function that makes no assumptions about the 
structure unless there is preference information to support it. We note that equation (17) does not 
incorporate any information about Kim’s risk attitude over the sub-intervals. In Section 6 we will 
refer back to this example and incorporate risk aversion into Kim’s formulation.    
5.2. Inferring Utility Values by Observing Decisions 
We now apply the maximum entropy utility principle to infer a decision maker’s utility 
function by observing previous decisions. We assume that the decision maker maximized her 
expected utility in making these decisions and that the lotteries she was facing are known. If the 
decision maker prefers a lottery with cumulative distribution   to a lottery Gx we add an 
additional inequality constraint that the expected utility of   is greater than or equal to that of 






                 (19) 
     () () () ()
() () | ()()  () () | ()()









Uxd Fx Uxd Gx








where  Ux  due to the use of a normalized utility function.   ( ) ( )| ( ) ( )| 1
b
a Fx UxGx =
b
a =
The maximum entropy utility formulation becomes 
 
Page 20                                   (20) 
maxent() a r g m a x ( () l n (() ) )
  
          ( ) 1,  ( ) 0


















This problem can be solved using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions or by 
discretization and a numerical optimization package.  The use of an equality constraint in 
equation (19) provides at least one feasible solution to this problem in the form of equation (13), 
where  . The feasible region is convex due to the linear inequality 
constraints, and the concavity of the entropy expression provides a unique maximum entropy 
solution over the set of feasible solutions. To demonstrate an application of this formulation we 
consider the following example. 
1() [ () () ] hx G x Fx =−
Example 3: A decision maker with an exponential CARA utility function and a risk 
tolerance of $300,000 faces a deal whose prospects range from $0 to $1 Million.  
Let us assume that an observer is trying to infer the decision maker’s utility function, and 
that the only information that is available to him is the domain of monetary prospects that the 
decision maker is facing. As explained above, the maximum entropy utility solution is risk 
neutral over this domain. Figure 4 (a) shows the maximum entropy utility function and the 
decision maker’s utility function. If the decision maker faces the two lotteries of Figure 4 (b) and 
prefers lottery 2 to lottery 1, an additional inequality constraint can be added into the maximum 
entropy formulation as described above. Figure 4(b) shows the effect of observing this decision 
on the maximum entropy utility function. Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show how the maximum entropy 
utility function is updated after observing more decisions made by the decision maker.  
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Figure 5. (a) Second Observation (deal 4 is preferred to deal 3). (b) Third Observation (deal 6 is 
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5.3.  Maximum Entropy Multiattribute Utility  
When the decision situation has multiple attributes, a value function is constructed to rank 
order the prospects, and a utility function is assigned over the value function to represent the 
decision maker’s risk attitude towards value (for more details on this method see Matheson and 
 
Page 22 Howard 1968, Dyer and Sarin 1979 and 1982, and Keeney and Raiffa 1976). Using this 
approach, a maximum entropy multiattribute utility function can be constructed with partial 
preference information using a utility assessment over the value function in the maximum 
entropy formulation. The following example, adapted from (Howard, 1980) illustrates this 
approach. 
Example 4: Utility Function for Health State and Consumption 
A decision maker facing prospects of medical surgery provides a value function over two 
attributes: consumption,  x, and health state,  . The health state is a disability level normalized 
from 0 (instant painless death) to 1 (current health with no disability). The value model over 
consumption and health states is a Cobb-Douglas function given as   
y
 (,) ,   0 1 ,   0 1 Vxy y x x y
η = ≤≤ ≤≤ ,                                          (21) 
where x is in millions of  dollars, y is the health state, and η is the trade-off coefficient. 
Now we assign a utility function over the value function. If all we know about the prospects 
is the domain of their attributes, the maximum entropy assignment produces a uniform utility 
density over value and a corresponding linear (risk neutral) utility function over the value model, 
maxent((,) ) (,) ,  0 1 ,  0 1 UV x y V x y y x x y
η = =≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ .                               (22) 
The marginal utility functions for the individual attributes that correspond to this maximum 
entropy assignment are 
  .                                (23)  ( ) ,0 1  and  ( ) ,0 1 Ux x x Uy y y
η =≤ ≤ = ≤ ≤
In this example, the maximum entropy utility function is risk neutral over value, so the risk 
attitude towards each attribute is determined by the value function. The decision maker is risk 
neutral over health states but his utility function for consumption depends on the trade-off 
coefficient,  η: the decision maker is risk averse for consumption if  1 η < and risk seeking if 
 
Page 23 1 η > . Figure 6 shows the isopreference contours and the maximum entropy utility surface when 
only the bounds on the domain of the attributes are available. If additional information is 
available (such as utility assessments) it can also be incorporated into the formulation as 
described above.  
Figure 6. (a) Utility Contour Plot. (b) Maximum Entropy Utility Surface for 0.7 η = . 
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6. MINIMUM CROSS ENTROPY UTILITY 
In many situations we may have additional knowledge about the shape of the utility 
function (concave or convex) or its relation to a certain family of utility functions. In this case we 
can use the analogy with probability theory to minimize the cross entropy measure (Kullback and 
Leibler 1951) to a known utility density function. Minimum cross entropy formulations for a 




() a r g m i n ( () l n ( ) )
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            ()()    1 , . . .;









ux u x d
qx
such that
hx ux d x i n









                                   (24) 
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, we have 
 
Page 24   0
1
()










=+ − + ∑ ∫∫ ∫ −              (25) 
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∂ ∑                             (26) 
From equation (26), we can see that the minimum cross entropy solution takes the form 
  ,                              (27) 
01 1 2 2 1 ( ) ( ) ..... ( )
minXent() ()
nn hx hx hx ux q x e
αα α α −− − − −− =
where  i α is the Lagrange multiplier for each constraint and  is the minimum cross 
entropy utility density.  From equation (27), we can see that maximizing the entropy of u(x)  is, 
therefore, a special case of minimizing the cross entropy when the target density, q(x), is uniform 
(risk neutral utility function). 
minXent() ux
6.1. Minimum Cross Entropy Risk Aversion 
If we take the logarithm of both sides of equation (27), we have   
  .              (28)  minXent 0 1 1 2 2 ln( ( )) ln( ( )) 1 ( ) ( ) ..... ( ) nn u x q x hx hx hx αα α α =− − − −− −
From equation (28) we can see that the risk aversion function,  minXent() x γ , for the minimum 
cross entropy utility solution is equal to the sum 
 
''
minXent minXent target 1 1 2 2 ( )  ln( ( ))    ( ) ( ) ( ) ..... ( ) nn
d ' x ux x h x h x h
dx
γγ α α =− = + + + + x α ,       (29) 




γ =−  is the risk aversion function of the target density.  












, which lead to 
 
Page 25 exponential and logarithmic utility functions respectively.  The target density is monotonically 
decreasing if the decision maker is risk averse and monotonically increasing if he is risk seeking. 
Example 5: The Party Problem Revisited 
To demonstrate an application of minimum cross entropy utility we refer back to the party 











, which gives a normalized logarithmic utility function 
over the domain [$0, $100]. Figure 7 shows the minimum cross entropy density, which is a 
piecewise inverse function that integrates to a piecewise logarithmic utility function and satisfies 
the given utility values. Incorporating knowledge of risk aversion through the target density, 
, contributes to the concavity of the utility function over the sub-intervals. The solution can 
be compared to the results of Figure 3 where no target density was available.  
() qx
Figure 7. (a) Comparison of maximum entropy and minimum cross entropy utility densities.  (b) 
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Page 26 7. CONCLUSIONS 
 In this paper, we introduced an analogy between utility and probability through the notion 
of a utility density function and presented a maximum entropy utility principle to assign utility 
values with partial preference information.  
Maximum entropy utility satisfies the main axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
normative utility theory. For example, since both transitivity and complete ordinal preferences 
were required for the prospects of the decision situation, the assigned maximum entropy utility 
values in turn satisfy transitivity and assign utility values for the complete set of prospects. The 
maximum entropy utility formulation assigns a unique utility value to each prospect due to the 
concavity of the entropy expression, and provides a continuous utility function over the domain 
of continuous attributes.  
Jaynes (1968) proposed a basic desideratum for probability assignment, suggesting that in 
two problems where we have the same information, we should assign the same probabilities. In a 
similar fashion, the maximum entropy utility principle satisfies the analogous desideratum that in 
two problems where we have the same preference information, we should assign the same utility 
values. The maximum entropy utility formulation assigns the same utility values in different 
problems if the same preference information is incorporated into the constraints.  
Maximum entropy utility also satisfies an essential desideratum of utility and probability 
independence that stems from the foundations of normative utility theory: the utility value of a 
prospect should not depend on the probability of getting that prospect due to the normative 
separation of beliefs from preferences  (Samuelson 1952). The utility values assigned by 
maximum entropy utility do not depend on the lottery that the decision maker is facing.  
The utility- probability analogy leads to further research on joint utility density functions 
for multiple attributes, utility inference mechanisms analogous to Bayes’ rule for probability 
 
Page 27 inference, graphical representations of multiattribute utility functions, and duals to expected 
utility formulations with the roles of probability and utility reversed. 
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APPENDIX: MAXIMUM ENTROPY SOLUTION 
The maximum entropy formulation for moments and/ or fractile constraints is   
                                        (A.I) 
()                  max  ( )ln( ( ))        
   ()()     1 , . . .;










subject to h x f x dx i n








where  [a,b] is the support of the maximum entropy distribution,  is either an indicator 
function over  an interval for fractile constraints, or 
( ) i hx
xraised to a certain power, for moment 
constraints, and    i µ ’s are a given sequence of fractiles or moments.  
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, we have 
  0
1




L f f x f x dx f x dx h x f x dx α αµ
=
=− − − ∑ ∫∫ ∫ − ,      (A.II) 
where  i α is the Lagrange multiplier for each fractile or moment constraint. 















= −− − −
∂ ∑ = .                    (A.III) 
Re-arranging equation (A.III) gives    
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1 01 1 2 2 ( ) ( ) ..... ( ) ()
nn hx hx hx fx e
α αα α − − −− − − = .                       (A.IV) 
For example, when no constraints are available, except that the density function is 
normalized and non-negative, the maximum entropy solution is uniform over a bounded domain.  
 
0 1 1
() ,    . f xe a x b
ba
α −− = =≤
−
≤                                  (A.V) 
Conversely, if the density function is of the form of equation (A.IV), then the constraint set 
needed for its assignment is    




hxfx d x i n µ == ∫
By writing any density function in the form of (A.IV), we can determine the constraints in 
the maximum entropy formulation that lead to its assignment.  This is known as the inverse 
maximum entropy problem. For example, we can rewrite a Beta density in the form 
 
1 1 ln( ( , )) ( 1)ln ( 1)ln(1 ) 1
() ( 1 ) ,   0 1
(,)
mnB e t a m n m x n x f xx x e
Beta m n
−− − − − − − − =− = x ≤ ≤
2
 (A.VII) 
Comparing (A.IV) and (A.VII), we can see that the constraint set needed to produce a beta 




l n ()() ,l n ( 1 )() xfxd x xfxd x µ µ = − ∫∫ = ,                            (A.VIII) 
where  1 µ and  2 µ are given constants.  
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